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Give Me Your Password Because Congress Can Say So: 
An Analysis of Fifth Amendment Protection Afforded 
Individuals Regarding Compelled Production of Encrypted 
Data and Possible Solutions to the Problem of Getting Data 
from Someone’s Mind 
Michael Wachtel* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 2009, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents 
compelled Google Inc. to disclose a wealth of incriminating documents from a 
suspect’s Google Docs account.1 The suspects, “Levi Beers and Chris de Diego, 
[were] the alleged operators of a firm called Pulse Marketing.”2 They were 
suspected of launching a deceptive email marketing campaign, “spamming” 
millions of users with information regarding a diet supplement.3 The suspects were 
shocked to find out that their documents were not secured or protected, because 
they thought Google, the company providing electronic document storage services, 
had a duty to maintain its customers’ privacy.4 The FBI was not only able to 
compel Google to release information; it did so without having to show probable 
cause.5 Instead the FBI needed to establish the lower “reasonable ground” standard 
to obtain the information.6 The government is able to obtain documents from a 
third-party storage, or email provider, under the 1986 Stored Communications Act 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Rutgers University School of Law, Class of 2014. This note is dedicated to my 
mom, dad, and the Aharon family, for without their love, support, and guidance I would not have been 
able to get through the rigors of law school. 
1 Kevin Poulsen, Spam Suspect Uses Google Docs: FBI Happy, WIRED (Apr. 16, 2010 3:20 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/cloud-warrant/. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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(SCA).7 The SCA enables the government to access a customer’s data whenever 
there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that the information would be relevant in 
a criminal investigation.8 In addition to Google, other third-party storage providers 
have admitted that government compulsion of a customer’s data would be possible 
even if the data is encrypted by the third-party provider.9 A spokesperson for 
Dropbox Inc., a corporation that provides the extremely popular online storage 
system, explained that “like most online services, we have a small number of 
employees who must be able to access user data for the reasons stated in our 
privacy policy (e.g., when legally required to do so).”10 Thus, companies like 
Google and Dropbox Inc. will not protect their customers’ files against government 
intrusion.11 However, what about individuals who encrypt and store their files in 
personal storage systems, such as a computer? 
                                                          
7 Poulsen, supra note 1; see also Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional 
Records Access Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). 
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012), stating in relevant parts: 
(a) Contents of wire or electronic communications in 
electronic storage. A governmental entity may require the 
disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of 
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, that is in 
electronic storage in an electronic communications system for 
one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant 
issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued 
using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. (emphasis added). 
(d) Requirements for court order. A court order for 
disclosure under subsection (b) or (c) may be issued by any 
court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue 
only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the 
records or other information sought, are relevant and material to 
an ongoing criminal investigation. In the case of a State 
governmental authority, such a court order shall not issue if 
prohibited by the law of such State. A court issuing an order 
pursuant to this section, on a motion made promptly by the 
service provider, may quash or modify such order, if the 
information or records requested are unusually voluminous in 
nature or compliance with such order otherwise would cause an 
undue burden on such provider. (emphasis added). 
9 See, e.g., Ryan Singel, Dropbox Lied to Users About Data Security, Complaint to FTC Alleges, 
WIRED (May 13, 2011 4:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/05/dropbox-ftc/. 
10 Id. 
11 The Government’s action compelling Google to give them Levi Beers’ and Chris de Diego’s 
files on Google Docs was based in the Western District of New York where the CSA is still judicially 
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Today, personal computers are in many respects akin to a safe: they are used 
to protect documents and files that the owner wishes to remain private. Why else 
would a person utilize password based encryption tools on their computer if they 
were not trying to keep it private? Although the Fourth Amendment ensures that 
citizens are protected against unlawful searches and seizures, it also permits the 
government to seize a person’s computer if they have “probable cause” to do so.12 
In light of this, an interesting issue arises when the hard drive of a lawfully seized 
computer is protected by software or an operating system, which cannot be cracked 
by the respective law enforcement’s forensic unit. This issue was addressed in In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Tecum Dated March 25, 2011 (United States v. Doe) (Doe 
IV), where the forensic detective was unable to decrypt a suspect’s seized laptop.13 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit declared that compelling the 
defendant to relinquish his password in order for the state to decrypt his files was 
unconstitutional, and violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.14 
This Note addresses how courts currently view the government’s attempted 
compulsion of a defendant’s password and encryption keys, and whether the 
government’s use of this information to decrypt the defendant’s device triggers the 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Additionally, this 
Note analyzes the suggested solutions for how to deal with password-encrypted 
data in a trial setting, and recommends a legislative solution. Part I provides 
background information regarding encryption technology, and how the technology 
creates an evidence collection problem for the state’s case in chief. Part II 
addresses whether password compulsion is violative of the Fifth Amendment under 
stare decisis, and how the forgone conclusion doctrine relates to evidence that 
might be protected by a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege. Part III analyzes 
the pros and cons of current and suggested ways of overcoming Fifth Amendment 
protection that were granted based on the privilege clause against self-
incrimination. Finally, this Note addresses the following issue: whether legislation 
                                                                                                                                      
adhered by that circuit. See Poulsen, supra note 1. But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286 
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that Internet Service Provider customers deserve a reasonable expectation of 
privacy and the SCA is unconstitutional to the extent that it allows the government to obtain emails 
without a warrant). However, other circuits, like the second circuit in Google’s case are not forced to 
follow the sixth circuit’s precedent, until the Supreme Court makes a final determination regarding the 
CSA. 
12 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized”). 
13 United States v. Doe, 670 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Doe IV]. 
14 Id. at 1352–53. 
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dealing with the encryption problem would pass constitutional muster and, if so, 
whether it could offer a viable solution to the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination that passwords create. 
I. ENCRYPTION: HISTORY AND ITS EFFICACY 
The study and practice of encryption is referred to as cryptography.15 
Originally cryptography meant the science of secret writing.16 Today cryptography 
is the study of how parties safeguard important information on personal devices, 
such as computers, by using passwords as a form of encryption.17 Cryptography is 
not a recent innovation and humans have been using forms of data protection for 
nearly 4,000 years.18 Encryption places a password on or blocks access to certain 
data, making it undecipherable to third parties.19 That data can only become 
accessible to a third party if it is decrypted-turning the undecipherable data into 
regular text.20 Depending on if the data is encrypted or decrypted, it is either 
“plaintext” or “ciphertext.”21 The “plaintext” is the data that a person wishes to 
encrypt, while the “ciphertext” is the undecipherable product resulting from the 
encryption.22 “Anyone wishing to uncover the secret message, including the 
government acting in their criminal investigatory capacities, will be after the 
underlying data, i.e., the plaintext.”23 
An example of this practice during Greek times, “involved the tattooing of a 
secret message on the scalp of a slave, allowing the slave’s hair to grow back, and 
then sending the slave to the recipient of the message so that his head could be 
shaved and the secret message revealed.”24 Julius Caesar used cryptography to 
prevent his military communications from being intercepted. Caesar “employed the 
simple cryptographic process of shifting every letter in the alphabet up three steps, 
                                                          
15 Andrew J. Ungberg, Note, Protecting Privacy Through a Responsible Decryption Policy, 22 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 537, 540 (2009). 
16 Brendan M. Palfreyman, Lessons from the British and American Approaches to Compelled 
Decryption, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 348 (2009). 
17 Ungberg, supra note 15, at 540. 
18 Id. 
19 Palfreyman, supra note 16, at 348–49. 
20 Id. at 348–49. 
21 Id. at 349. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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such that a ‘B’ would become a ‘E,’ and a ‘P’ would become an ‘S’.”25 Today, 
cryptography has become significantly more complex then when it was employed 
by the early Greeks and Caesar.26 Today, freely available software can render data 
virtually undecipherable without the proper password or encryption key.27 
Unlike the old days of ciphers being decoded by tattooing or the use of letter 
keys, today’s digital world requires complex methods for encryption and 
decryption.28 When a message is encrypted using current technology an 
“encryption key” is required to decrypt the message.29 An encryption key is 
basically a very long string of numbers that is stored in the encryption software’s 
memory.30 The software users do not have to remember this long number; “instead 
[they] can enter a more easily remembered password or passphrase, which in turn 
activates the encryption key.”31 When the government “seeks to compel an 
ordinary citizen to turn over the means by which he can decrypt the data, the 
disclosure order will typically compel him to turn over his password rather than the 
encryption key.”32 
The two primary encryption methods are public key encryption and or private 
key encryption.33 Most past encryption has been accomplished using the private 
key method.34 This method involves one key that is used for both encrypting and 
                                                          
25 Palfreyman, supra note 16, at 349. 
26 Id. 
27 A powerful software encryption program named TrueCrypt can be downloaded free of charge 
at its website, http://www.truecrypt.org/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2012). 
28 Palfreyman, supra note 16, at 350. 
29 Anoop MS, Public Key Cryptography: Application Algorithms and Mathematical Explanations 
(2007), available at http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/Public_Key_Cryptography_ 
AMS.pdf (“The public key algorithms operate sufficiently large numbers to make [deriving the private 
key from the public key] practically impossible and thus make the system secure. For example, RSA 
algorithm operates on large numbers of thousands of bits long.”). 
30 Id. 
31 Palfreyman, supra note 16, at 350. 
32 Id. at 350–51. 
33 See D. Forest Wolfe, The Government’s Right to Read: Maintaining State Access to Digital 
Data in the Age of Impenetrable Encryption, 49 EMORY L.J. 711, 715 (2000). 
34 Id. 
  
 
 
G I V E  M E  Y O U R  P A S S W O R D  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2013.132 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 
decrypting the encoded message.35 The sender uses a certain key to encrypt the 
message, and the receiver uses that same key to decrypt it.36 
In 1976, cryptologists Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman proposed a new 
method called public key encryption.37 In this system, there are two keys: a public 
key used for encryption and a private key used for decryption.38 The public key 
may be available to multiple persons or the public at large, but only the person 
using the encryption knows the private key.39 For example, if one wishes to send a 
secure message using this type of encryption, he would encrypt the message using a 
public key, send it, and then the recipient would decrypt the message using her 
private key.40 One hoping to intercept and decrypt this message would be unable to 
do so using only the public key, because it is a “computationally infeasible” task to 
derive the private key from the public key.41 This is known as a “one-way 
function” because the key is only easily solvable in one direction.42 The only way 
to ascertain the private key in such circumstances is to use a specialized computer 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Whitfield Diffe & Martin E. Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, 12 IEEE 
TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. THEORY 644 (1976), http://www4.ncsu.edu/~singer/437/proj38.pdf. Public 
key encryption was actually invented earlier than 1976 by members of the British Government 
Communications Headquarters, but their findings were not disclosed. See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not 
All Bad: An Historical Perspective on Software Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 
230 (2005). 
38 Anoop MS, supra note 29, at 3. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Diffie & Hellman, supra note 37, at 644. See also Anoop MS, supra note 29, at 1–2. It is an 
infeasible task to try to derive the key computationally because: 
The private and public key of a device is related by 
mathematical function called the one-way function. One-way 
functions are mathematical functions in which the forward 
operation can be done easily but the reverse operation is so 
difficult that it is practically impossible. In public key 
cryptography the public key is calculated using private key on 
the forward operation of the one-way function. Obtaining of 
private key from public key is a reverse operation. If the reverse 
operation can be done easily, that is if private key is obtained 
from the public key and other public data, then the public key 
algorithm for the particular key is cracked. The reverse 
operation gets difficult as the key size increases. 
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program that guesses, one at a time, the correct number.43 This process can take an 
exceptionally long time.44 Thus, breaking strong public key encryption is virtually 
impossible without compelling, or otherwise obtaining, access to the private key.45 
There are many software companies that offer key encryption technologies.46 
Microsoft Corporation’s Windows product has provided its BitLocker Drive 
Encryption utility free with the operating system since Windows Vista Ultimate47 
was generally released in January of 2007.48 Unlike some other encryption 
methods,49 BitLocker encrypts the entire hard drive and not just particular files.50 
BitLocker can “help block hackers from accessing the system files they rely on to 
discover your password, or from accessing your drive by removing it from your 
computer and installing it in a different computer.”51 When forensic detectives 
seize a suspect’s computer during an investigation, they have to remove the hard 
drive and make a copy of it in order to avoid tainting the evidence for trial 
purposes.52 BitLocker prevents the detective who is following proper evidence 
guidelines from being able to gain access the suspect’s hard drive. Furthermore, 
BitLocker encrypts files automatically and the files remain encrypted until they are 
                                                                                                                                      
42 Anoop MS, supra note 29, at 3. 
43 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Boucher, No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL 4246473, at 
*2 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007) (“The only way to get access without the password is to use an automated 
system which repeatedly guesses passwords. According to the government, the process . . . could take 
years. . . .”). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See Paul Rubens, Buyer’s Guide to Full Disk Encryption, ESECURITY PLANET (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/mobile-security/buyers-guide-to-full-disk-encryption.html (naming 
Microsoft’s BitLocker, TrueCrypt (for Windows or Macintosh), and McAfee Endpoint Protection as a 
few of the encryption products available). 
47 See Chapter 2: BitLocker Drive Encryption, MICROSOFT TECHNET (Apr. 4, 2007), 
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc162804(d=printer).aspx. 
48 See Tim Fisher, Windows Vista: Important Facts About Microsoft Windows Vista, ABOUT.COM 
(Dec. 24, 2012), http://pcsupport.about.com/od/windowsvista/a/windows-vista.htm. 
49 Encrypting File System (EFS) enables you to encrypt specific files on you operating system’s 
hard drive, but does not allow you to encrypt your whole hard drive. See Help protect your files using 
BitLocker Drive Encryption, MICROSOFT.COM, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows7/help-
protect-your-files-using-bitlocker-drive-encryption (last visited Oct. 16, 2013) [hereinafter BitLocker 
Info]. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1340 (stating the forensic examiner McCrohan testified for the state 
that he had to clone “5 TB of data from the digital media devices—an ‘enormous amount of data,’” 
further detailing what steps they followed in investigating the defendant’s computer). 
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decrypted, which is accomplished by entering the password recovery key.53 
Additionally, Microsoft’s operating system does not include a “backdoor,” which 
would enable one to “[bypass] normal authentication to gain access to a computer 
without the computer user knowing.”54 Therefore, in an investigation the state 
could not compel Microsoft to disclose the “master key” because Microsoft did not 
create one.55 
Strong encryption programs like BitLocker are available for other operating 
systems as well. Apple Inc. (Apple) provides a similar type of encryption utility 
called FireVault for its Macintosh computer users.56 The encryption program works 
with Apple’s operating system OS X Mountain Lion, the most common operating 
system.57 The disk encryption that it uses is a government approved, advanced 
encryption standard.58 In order to access FileVault, the user must enter a login 
password, Apple ID, and the program’s recovery key.59 This makes any Apple hard 
drive that is FireVault-enabled nearly impossible to access by forensic investigators 
during a criminal investigation. Like Microsoft, Apple has refused to program 
“backdoor” access for its users.60 
Finally, there are many popular publicly available encryption utilities if a user 
does not want to use Microsoft’s or Apple’s encryption programs.61 TrueCrypt is a 
free open-source disk encryption utility, available for both the Windows and 
Macintosh platforms.62 Unlike BitLocker and FileVault, TrueCrypt enables the user 
                                                          
53 See BitLocker Info, supra note 49. 
54 Joris Evers, Microsoft: Vista Won’t Get Backdoor, CNET.COM (Mar. 3, 2006, 6:00 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/Microsoft-Vista-wont-get-a-backdoor/2100-1016_3-6046016.html (reporting 
Microsoft has stated that it will not provide “backdoors” in its Windows Vista Ultimate that the 
government could use to access encrypted files). 
55 Id. See also BitLocker Info, supra note 49 (stating further on Microsoft’s website that a 
BitLocker user should “create [a] recovery key when you turn on BitLocker for the first time; otherwise, 
you could permanently lose access to your files.”). 
56 OS X Mountain Lion: About FileVault Disk Encryption, APPLE.COM, http://support.apple.com/ 
kb/PH10578 (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. (stating that Apple’s encryption is 128-bit AES key encryption, one of the strongest 
encryption platforms). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. (stating “Warning: Don’t forget your administrator password. If you turn on disk encryption 
and then forget your log in password, your Apple ID, and your recovery key, you won’t be able to log 
in, and your files and settings are lost forever”). 
61 See Rubens, supra note 46. 
62 TRUECRYPT.ORG, http://www.truecrypt.org/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
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to create multiple passwords within the encrypted date and, in a sense, create 
hidden files or volumes that are encrypted within the encryption.63 This means that 
even if a user is compelled to provide her first password, the second password that 
was created for hidden files will not be discovered.64 Additionally, when an 
unauthorized user attempts to access the non-hidden password and fails, the hidden 
section is automatically filled with random data and held there until the right 
password is entered.65 The hidden data will remain filled and blocked with random 
data, appearing as random digits to a person attempting to view the data, until the 
first password is entered correctly.66 
The defendant in Doe IV used TrueCrypt to encrypt his hard drive.67 The 
detective testified that he “accessed parts of the drive only to find ‘a blank area of 
the hard drive, and there was no data, you know, physically, that we were able to 
see.’”68 Based on the foregoing, the government will probably not be able to access 
a suspect’s computer that is encrypted with one of the aforementioned utilities 
without the encryption password. 
                                                          
63 See Hidden Volume, TRUECRYPT.ORG, http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/hidden-volume (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2012). 
64 Id. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. The TrueCrypt organization states: 
TrueCrypt first attempts to decrypt the standard volume 
header [data] using the entered password. If it fails, it 
loads the area of the volume where a hidden volume 
header can be stored . . . to RAM [memory] and attempts 
to decrypt it using the entered password. Note that the 
hidden [data] cannot be identified, as they appear to 
consist entirely of random data. If the header is 
successfully decrypted . . . the information about the size 
of the hidden volume is retrieved from the decrypted 
header . . . and the hidden [data] is [revealed]. 
67 See Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1340. 
68 Id. at 1340 n.10. 
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II. FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE 
The Fifth Amendment’s assurance that no person “shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself”69 is “one of the great landmarks in 
man’s struggle to be free of tyranny, to be decent and civilized.”70 But one question 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address regarding the Fifth Amendment is 
whether the state’s compulsion of an arrestee’s computer password is a per se 
violation of that arrestee’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In 
other words, whether the right not to supply the state with a password is akin to the 
right not to respond to a criminal inquiry when being questioned by the state, or the 
right to remain silent. One of the Supreme Court’s main motivations in securing the 
right of silence was to avoid the “cruel trilemma”71 thereby preserving individual 
autonomy.72 The cruel trilemma is the decision a defendant would face if forced to 
choose between maintaining her silence (not providing the password) and being 
held in contempt of court, or speaking (providing the password) and either 
perjuring or incriminating herself.73 The Fifth Amendment provides individuals a 
way out of this cruel choice—remain silent without fear of contempt.74 But other 
than the scenario of arrestee silence, the Court has analyzed what types of 
individual compulsions, e.g., forced blood tests, alcohol tests, and compelling a 
defendant’s combination to a safe, may or may not be covered by the Fifth 
Amendment. This has resulted in various approaches and tests that courts now 
adopt. 
A. The Nature and Scope of the Self-Incrimination Privilege 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Authement 
established that in order for an individual to fall within the protection of the Fifth 
Amendment they must establish the following three elements: (1) compulsion, (2) a 
testimonial communication or act, and (3) incrimination.75 The first element, 
                                                          
69 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
70 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF LIBERTY 238 (1954). 
71 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional 
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 694–95 (1968); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 
55 (1964) (describing how the Court is unwilling “to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt”). 
72 See John Lilburne, The Just Defense of John Lilburne, reprinted in THE LEVELLER TRACTS, 
1647–1653, at 450, 454, (William Haller & Godfrey eds., Columbia Univ. Press 1944, 1653). 
73 See Friendly, supra note 71, at 695. 
74 Id. 
75 United States v. Authement, 607 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1979). 
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compulsion, has been defined by courts in many ways,76 and compelling a 
password to be disclosed may be construed as a unique act of compulsion which 
will be discussed later in section B. The second and third elements deal with 
protecting oneself from being a witness against him or herself. This part of the 
Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination is satisfied if the evidence 
or act being sought from the defendant by the state is testimonial in nature and 
therefore self-incriminating.77 Whether an act or piece of evidence qualifies as 
testimonial may depend on the court’s adherence to stare decisis. 
In Schmerber v. California, the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment 
“protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or 
otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative 
nature.”78 In Schmerber the defendant was forced to submit a blood sample after he 
was pulled over in his automobile in order to determine his blood-alcohol content.79 
The Court held that the drawing of blood in those circumstances did not violate the 
Fifth Amendment.80 The Court explained, “[the] distinction which has emerged, 
often expressed in different ways, is that the privilege [against self-incrimination] is 
a bar against compelling communications or testimony, but that compulsion which 
makes a suspect accused of real or physical evidence does not violate it.”81 
Schmerber’s holding has not been easily understood. Some scholars note that 
Schmerber leaves serious Fifth Amendment questions unanswered.82 The Court’s 
distinction between physical and non-physical evidence can be seen in the 
following situation: if a suspect who is hooked up to a polygraph machine is forced 
to submit to questioning but not compelled to answer, the Fifth Amendment would 
not be implicated because the suspect has not provided any communication or 
testimony.83 The scientific evidence that could be collected in this situation, such as 
heart rate and blood pressure, is permissible because it constitutes physical 
                                                          
76 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79, 84–85 (1973) (analyzing different ways that 
compulsion has been defined under the Fifth Amendment). 
77 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). 
78 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761 (1966). 
79 Id. at 758–59. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 764. 
82 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristie Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and its 
Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 259–60 (2004). 
83 Id. at 248–49, 261. 
  
 
 
G I V E  M E  Y O U R  P A S S W O R D  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2013.132 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
evidence.84 Importantly, this evidence, though not testimonial under Schmerber, 
could serve as self-incriminating evidence against the accused. For this reason, the 
Court seems to be drawing an unexplained divergence between certain violations of 
the Fifth Amendment. The Court further recognizes this concern regarding physical 
evidence which could serve as self-incriminating evidence by stating, “[t]here will 
be many cases in which such a distinction is not readily drawn. Some test 
seemingly directed to obtain ‘physical evidence’ for example lie detector tests 
measuring changes in body function during interrogation, may actually be directed 
to eliciting responses that are testimonial.”85 The Court then concludes to “compel 
a person to submit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt 
or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether willed or not, is to 
evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth Amendment.”86 
After Schmerber, the Court shifted its focus away from the notion of physical 
versus non-physical evidence in determining whether an action or statement is 
testimonial. Instead, the Court focused on whether the defendant confronted the 
cruel trilemma.87 In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, the defendant was pulled over on 
suspicion of drunk driving.88 Muniz was arrested due to his intoxication, and at trial 
the officers testified that Muniz appeared intoxicated during their questioning of 
him because he had incorrectly answered a question about the date of his sixth 
birthday.89 Muniz objected to the admission of the substance of his statements as 
well as inferences that could be drawn from them, since he contended they violated 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.90 
Regarding the officer’s testimony that Muniz responded to questions with 
slurred speech, the Court held that “any slurring of speech and other evidence of 
lack of muscular coordination revealed by Muniz’s responses to Officer 
Hosterman’s direct questions constitute nontestimonial components of those 
responses.”91 Consequently, evidence of Muniz’s physical condition while 
answering the questions was not protected by the Fifth Amendment. However, 
Muniz’s assertion that his failure to recall the date of his sixth birthday was deemed 
                                                          
84 Id. at 261. 
85 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966). 
86 Id. 
87 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596–99 (1990). 
88 Id. at 585. 
89 Id. at 586–87. 
90 Id. at 587. 
91 Id. at 592. 
  
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2013.132 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
inadmissible on grounds that it was testimonial.92 The Court ruled “when a suspect 
is asked for a response requiring him to communicate an express or implied 
assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the ‘trilemma’ of truth, falsity, or 
silence, and hence the response contains a testimonial component.”93 
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held that the Fifth Amendment protects 
individual suspects and defendants when they face a cruel trilemma.94 For Muniz, 
the trilemma was the choice to either not answer the police officers questions and 
appear to be hiding something, or answer the questions incorrectly and face 
incriminating himself. Thus Muniz should be protected from having to decide 
between whether to answer the officer’s complex questions and relinquish his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, or to not answer these questions and appear guilty. 
Unfortunately, like in Schmerber, the broad language of Muniz has been 
difficult to define and apply. This is due in part to the diverse opinions amongst the 
Justices in concluding whether the question relating to the date of Muniz’s sixth 
birthday was truly testimonial.95 Five Justices found that Muniz’s response to the 
question should be excluded. However Justice Marshall cast the deciding vote, and 
wrote separately stating the response was inadmissible because Muniz was not 
given adequate Miranda warnings prior to questioning.96 Although it is clear that 
the birthday question in Justice Marshall’s mind was testimonial, he never had to 
reach this conclusion since he determined that Muniz was not given his Miranda 
warnings. 
Writing for the four dissenting Justices, Justice Rehnquist argued that because 
“it was permissible for the police to extract and examine a sample of Schmerber’s 
blood to determine how much that part of his system had been affected by alcohol,” 
it should be equally permissible to evaluate Muniz’s speech in order to evaluate his 
level of intoxication.97 Muniz is still good law, though it rests on a shaky 
foundation due to the Justices’ varying opinions. 
In Doe v. United States (Doe II), the Supreme Court attempted to define the 
limits of the Fifth Amendment’s protections regarding a defendant who is 
compelled to provide allegedly self-incriminating evidence in order to assist the 
                                                          
92 Id. at 599. 
93 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 597. 
94 Id. at 597–98. 
95 Allen & Mace, supra note 82, at 274–75. 
96 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 608. 
97 Id. at 607. 
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government with their investigation.98 In Doe, several Cayman Islands and 
Bermuda banks refused to comply with the U.S. government’s subpoenas to turn 
over any accounts or records associated with Doe because their governments 
prohibited such disclosure without customer consent.99 Consequently, the U.S. 
government filed a motion to have Doe sign a consent form, which did not identify 
or acknowledge the existence of any accounts, authorizing the banks to disclose 
any records so that the banks would comply with the U.S. government’s 
subpoenas.100 The lower court ordered the defendant to sign the consent form.101 
The Supreme Court found that although “the executed form allows the 
Government access to a potential source of evidence, the directive itself does not 
point the Government toward hidden accounts or otherwise provide information 
that will assist the prosecution in uncovering evidence.”102 The Court concluded 
that the consent form was not testimonial in nature because in “signing the form, 
Doe [made] no statement, explicit or implicit, regarding the existence of a foreign 
bank account or his control over any such account.”103 Additionally, his signing the 
form did not “admit the authenticity of any records produced by the bank.”104 
Following Doe II and Muniz, the Court in United States v. Hubbell held that 
evidence may be excluded if the suspect was forced to utilize mental capacities in 
producing it.105 In Hubbell the defendant was being investigated for a series of 
federal offenses regarding his corporation.106 During a previous prosecution on 
unrelated charges, the defendant agreed to provide information related to the 
subsequent investigation of his corporation.107 Pursuant to that agreement, the 
prosecutor in the second case subpoenaed the same defendant to provide any and 
all documents relating to his corporation.108 The defendant initially claimed that the 
use of the agreement to compel information relating to the second investigation 
                                                          
98 Doe II, 487 U.S. 201 (1988). 
99 Id. at 205–06. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 205. 
102 Id. at 215. 
103 Id. at 215–16. 
104 Doe II, 487 U.S. 216. 
105 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
106 Id. at 30. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 31. 
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violated his Fifth Amendment rights; however, he later complied after being 
granted immunity. Despite the grant of immunity, the government still indicted 
Hubbell on tax evasion and fraud charges.109 
With regards to Hubbell’s act of producing the documents, the Supreme Court 
held that forcing a defendant to provide a prosecutor with information that would 
lead to potentially incriminating evidence contravenes the defendant’s rights 
against compelled self-incrimination.110 The Court reasoned that “[i]t was 
unquestionably necessary for respondent to make extensive use of contents of his 
own mind in identifying the hundreds of documents responsive to the requests in 
the subpoena.”111 Moreover, the Court emphasized that “[t]he assembly of those 
documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like 
being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.”112 
Following Hubbell, commentators were quick to recognize that the Court was 
apparently changing the focus of its Fifth Amendment analysis.113 The Court 
seemed to change its test from a physical versus non-physical distinction to a test 
that prevents the government from compelling a suspect’s mental powers to 
assemble its case.114 This dramatic shift could have serious implications for future 
applications of both Schmerber and Muniz to the extent that the blanket categorical 
rules presented in those cases may be displaced by the cognitive standard set out in 
Hubbell. However, some scholars point out that Hubbell does not explicitly adopt a 
cognitive requirement, but instead can only be read to imply such a test.115 
It is unclear whether Schmerber, Muniz, Doe II, or Hubbell will be the 
controlling case for what constitutes testimonial acts protected by the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. However, it is completely 
plausible that the Supreme Court will not adopt a particular standard, and instead 
proceed on a case-by-case basis in analyzing whether the compulsion is testimonial 
and deserving of Fifth Amendment protection. Notwithstanding further speculation 
regarding what the Supreme Court will do, when it comes to the state forcing a 
defendant to give up their computer password, as the next section points out, the 
                                                          
109 Id. at 27–28. 
110 See id. at 43. 
111 Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43. 
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., Jody C. Barillare, Comment, As its Next Witness, The State Calls . . . The Defendant: 
Brain Fingerprinting as “Testimonial” Under the Fifth Amendment, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 971, 991 (2006). 
114 Id. 
115 See id. 
  
 
 
G I V E  M E  Y O U R  P A S S W O R D  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2013.132 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
lower courts have generally followed the Hubbell line of thinking, except for a 
limited number of exceptions.116 
B. Compelled Passwords are Testimonial and Incriminating Since They 
Reveal the Contents of One’s Mind 
After Hubbell, Muniz, and Schmerber, the Supreme Court still did not face the 
issue of computer passwords, and whether they were testimonial, and therefore 
protected under the Fifth Amendment. But in United States v. Fisher the Court 
established that the reach of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination might extend to a defendant who is compelled to produce 
incriminating evidence.117 Furthermore, in United States v. Doe (Doe I), the Court 
held that even the act of producing unprotected and unprivileged evidence by a 
defendant for the state could have communicative aspects that may be 
“testimonial” and thereby entitled to Fifth Amendment protection.118 The Court 
stated that “the contents of a document may not be privileged, [however] the act of 
producing the document may be.”119 
The lower courts faced tough questions when dealing with the circumstances 
of a defendant having to disclose a password to the prosecution to allow them to 
gain access to the defendant’s property. Can the state compel the disclosure of the 
contents of one’s mind without leading to a Hubbell violation? More 
fundamentally, does the compelled use of a password that decrypts a defendant’s 
encryption software become an act of production and thus a violation of the 
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights under Doe I? The Sixth Circuit addressed the 
Hubbell question in the following cases. 
In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in United 
States v. Kirschner addressed whether a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination extended to the defendant’s computer password.120 The 
government had issued a subpoena compelling the defendant to provide all 
passwords associated with his computer or any files on the computer.121 With the 
                                                          
116 See Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1346 (concluding what the government sought to compel demanded 
the contents of one’s mind their password key, and therefore it was testimonial and covered under 
Hubbell. Additionally, since the foregone conclusion doctrine was not applicable in this instance it could 
not be viewed as an exception to Hubbell’s use of mind test.). 
117 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976). 
118 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984) [Doe I]. 
119 Id. 
120 United States v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665, 668 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
121 Id. at 666. 
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subpoena, the government sought evidence of child pornography allegedly 
contained in encrypted files on the defendant’s computer.122 The defendant filed a 
motion to quash the subpoena based on his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.123 
The court answered the defendant’s motion by analyzing relevant Supreme 
Court precedent.124 Referencing Hubbell, the court stated that it “agree[d] with 
[the] Defendant because . . . [the precedent was] set forth in United States v. 
Hubbell.”125 The court analogized a computer password to a wall safe combination 
that only resides in someone’s mind, which, as Hubbell resolved, is testimonial, 
and therefore protected.126 By stating that this “case is not about producing specific 
documents—it is about specific testimony asserting a fact,” the Court concluded 
that the self-incrimination clause protected the defendant from revealing his 
computer password procured through mental processes to assert an incriminating 
fact.127 
In February 2012, the Eleventh Circuit in Doe IV addressed the Doe I act of 
production issue regarding when a compelled act is testimonial.128 It also addressed 
whether the act of decryption itself, based on passwords given by a defendant, 
would be protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.129 
The government was investigating Doe, a Youtube.com account holder suspected 
of sharing child pornography.130 By tracing several Internet protocol addresses, 
government officials tracked Doe to several hotels.131 They subsequently secured 
and executed a warrant for Doe’s hotel room; officers seized seven pieces of digital 
                                                          
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 668. 
125 Id. 
126 Kirchner, 823 F. Supp. 2d. at 669 (quoting Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 43). For further support, the 
court cited Justice Steven’s majority opinion in Hubbell, and analogizes the compulsion of a computer 
password to that of privileged information that was recalled in an individual’s mind. The court stated, 
“[t]he assembly of those documents was like telling an inquisitor the combination to a wall safe, not like 
being forced to surrender the key to a strongbox.” Id. See also Part II B supra discussing Hubbell. 
127 Kirchner, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 669. 
128 See Part II A supra discussing Doe I. 
129 Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1341. 
130 Id. at 1339. 
131 Id. 
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media, including two laptops and five external hard drives.132 While analyzing the 
digital media, the forensic examiners could not gain access to the hard drives 
because they were encrypted with the TrueCrypt software.133 The government tried 
to avoid triggering Doe’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by 
offering him a limited act-of-production immunity in exchange for his password.134 
Doe refused; he reasoned that the immunity would not extend to the government’s 
derivative use of the hard drives after they obtained his password.135 He was held in 
civil contempt because he refused to decrypt the hard drives for the grand jury 
subpoena.136 He appealed his contempt judgment, and challenged the order given 
by the prosecutor to decrypt the drives as a violation of his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination.137 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held that the “decryption 
and production of the hard drives’ contents would trigger Fifth Amendment 
protection because it would be testimonial, and that such protection would extend 
to the Government’s use of the drives’ contents.”138 Echoing Hubbell, the court 
stated that, “[t]he touchstone of whether an act of production is testimonial is 
whether the government compels the individual to use the ‘contents of his own 
mind’ to explicitly or implicitly communicate some statement of fact.”139 The court 
stressed that the act of decryption and production would require Doe to reveal the 
contents of his mind.140 The court further reasoned that “[r]equiring Doe to use a 
decryption password is most certainly more akin to requiring the production of a 
combination because both demand the use of the contents of the mind, and the 
production is accompanied by [] implied factual statements [] that could prove to 
be incriminatory.”141 
Thus, in criminal cases where the government compels a defendant to provide 
a computer password, or to provide the computer or it’s drives in an already 
                                                          
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1340. See Part I supra discussing TrueCrypt software. 
134 Id. at 1339. 
135 Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1339. 
136 Id. at 1340. 
137 Id. at 1341. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1345. 
140 Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1346. 
141 Id. 
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decrypted state (with the password already entered), circuit courts have agreed that 
this type of request violates the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination. 
The reason being that entering a password to decrypt one’s computer requires an 
individual to use the contents of one’s mind in order to communicate a potentially 
incriminating fact. 
C. The Foregone Conclusion Doctrine: A Limited Exception 
While the precedent that Hubbell sets—that compulsion of the contents of 
one’s mind by the government is testimonial and therefore protected by the Fifth 
Amendment—is still good law, courts have carved out an exception to this rule. 
The foregone conclusion doctrine holds that if the state in an investigation is able to 
prove that the contents they are trying to compel have been reasonably seen and 
verified, then it is a foregone conclusion that the evidence sought is known and 
therefore will not be protected under the ambit of the Fifth Amendment.142 In In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated October 29, 1992 (United States v. 
Doe) (Doe III), the Second Circuit said that the existence and location of a 
calendar, that the state compelled the defendant to produce, was a foregone 
conclusion.143 This was because it was known, through production of a photocopy, 
that the suspect had possession of the calendar and therefore compulsion of the 
original added little or nothing to the sum total of the government’s information.144 
This exception has become known as the “foregone conclusion” doctrine.145 
In 2006, Sebastien Boucher was crossing the Canadian border into Vermont 
when he was stopped by U.S. Customs officials.146 After a secondary inspection, a 
customs agent found a laptop in the back seat of his car.147 The agents were able to 
gain access to approximately 40,000 images without the use of a password.148 A 
special agent with experience in recognizing child pornography discovered 
                                                          
142 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher (Boucher II), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2009 WL 
424718, at *3 (D. Vt. Feb. 19, 2009). 
143 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated October 29, 1992, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d. Cir. 
1993) [hereinafter Doe III]; see also United States v. Fisher, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976). 
144 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 411. 
145 See id. (stating the original foundation of the foregone conclusion doctrine was established in 
Fisher v. United State where the Court stressed where the existence and location of evidence is known 
to the government, “no constitutional rights are touched because the matters are a foregone 
conclusion”); see also Doe III, 1 F.3d at 93. 
146 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher (Boucher I), No. 2:06-mj-91, 2007 WL 
4246473, at *1 (D. Vt. Nov. 29, 2007). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
  
 
 
G I V E  M E  Y O U R  P A S S W O R D  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2013.132 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
thousands of images depicting adult and child pornography.149 After Boucher was 
read his Miranda rights, the agent asked Boucher if he could view the contents of a 
hard drive labeled drive Z.150 The agent asked Boucher to leave the room, and as he 
examined drive Z he found several additional images and videos of child 
pornography.151 The agent was able to view the images on the hard drive before it 
was shutdown, however, as soon as it was turned off, the encryption was activated 
and the computer was inaccessible for trial. Boucher was charged with the crime of 
transporting child pornography.152 
Like in Doe IV, the forensic detectives in Boucher I were unable to create a 
mirror of Boucher’s laptop contents because the videos on the Z drive were 
encrypted, and inaccessible without the password.153 In order to gain access to 
drive Z, the state sought a subpoena requiring Boucher to provide all passwords 
associated with the seized computer.154 Boucher moved to quash the subpoena 
asserting that the compulsion of his password was a violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination.155 The court agreed with Boucher and 
found that entering a computer password is testimonial because it implicitly 
communicates facts, and that if Boucher “[did] know the password, he would be 
faced with the forbidden trilemma: incriminate himself, lie under oath, or find 
himself in contempt of court.”156 
The state further argued that even if the compulsion of Boucher’s password 
was covered under the Fifth Amendment, the foregone conclusion doctrine permits 
the government’s access to the Z drive because a law enforcement agent already 
viewed some of the incriminating evidence before the computer was shut down.157 
The court in Boucher I held that even if the “government [had] seen some of the 
                                                          
149 Id. 
150 Id. at *2. 
151 Id. 
152 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Sebastien Boucher (Boucher I), 2007 WL at *2. 
153 See Boucher I, 2007 WL 4246473, at *2 (the state who brought in Secret Service Agent 
Mathew Fasvlo, who had experience in computer forensics and testified that “it [was] nearly impossible 
to access [the] encrypted files without knowing the password. There are no ‘back doors’ or secret 
entrances to access the files.”). 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at *3. 
157 Id. at *6. 
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files on drive Z, it [had] not viewed all or even most of them” and therefore the 
foregone conclusion was not an applicable exception.158 The state appealed. 
Chief Judge William Sessions overturned the magistrate judge, stating that 
“Second Circuit precedent . . . [did] not require that the government be aware of 
[all of] the incriminatory contents of the file; it requires the government to 
demonstrate with reasonable particularity that it knows of the existence and 
location of subsequent documents.”159 Judge Sessions declared that the state did 
have particular knowledge of the existence of child pornography on Boucher’s Z 
drive; consequently, the foregone conclusion doctrine applied.160 The court denied 
Boucher’s motion to quash the subpoena, and directed him to provide an 
unencrypted version of the Z drive.161 
In United States v. Fricosu, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Colorado was asked to decide whether the foregone conclusion doctrine applied to 
Ms. Ramona Fricosu.162 The FBI executed a search warrant at her residence during 
which agents seized six computers.163 Of the six computers, three were laptops, one 
of which had an encryption program that required a password to access its 
contents.164 The next day Fricosu spoke with her incarcerated husband Scott 
Whatcott, and through a recorded conversation Fricosu admitted that the encrypted 
laptop was hers.165 Based on the fact that the laptop was labeled 
“RS.WORKGROUP.Ramona”166 and pursuant to the All Writs Act,167 the state 
sought to require Fricosu to produce the unencrypted contents of the laptop.168 
Fricosu refused, and claimed the compelled disclosure of the password to decrypt 
the laptop violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.169 
                                                          
158 Id. 
159 Boucher II, 2009 WL at *3. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at *4. 
162 See United States v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1237 (D. Col. 2012). 
163 Id. at 1234. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1235. 
166 Id. at 1234. 
167 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (enabling the Supreme Court and all courts established by Congress 
to issue orders that aid in the usage and principles of law). 
168 Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
169 Id. 
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The court held that Fricosu was like the defendant in Boucher II, and said that 
there is “little question here but that the government knows of the existence and 
location of the computer’s files. The fact that it does not know the specific content 
of any specific document[] is not a barrier to production.”170 The court determined 
that the fact that she admitted to her husband during their phone conversation that 
the contents were accessible by only her and that the computer was identified as 
“RS.WORKGROUP.Ramona,” was sufficient for authorities to conclude that the 
contents belonged to her.171 Therefore, her motion to quash was denied, and the 
Fifth Amendment protection did not cover the production of the unencrypted 
contents of the requested laptop.”172 
In Doe IV, however, the defendant was able to quash the state’s motion 
compelling him to provide a password for his encrypted hard drive on Hubbell 
grounds.173 The court concluded that password disclosure meant disclosing the 
thoughts of the person’s mind.174 Despite this holding, the government had argued 
that even if password compulsion violated the Fifth Amendment, the foregone 
conclusion doctrine would still allow them to compel Doe to provide an 
unencrypted version of the drive.175 
The Eleventh Circuit denied the government’s claim and held that “[n]othing 
in the record [revealed] that the government knew whether any files exist or 
[where] the location of those files [was] on the hard drive.”176 Additionally, there 
was nothing to illustrate that the “Government knew with reasonable particularity 
that Doe was even capable of accessing the encrypted portions of the drives.”177 
Unlike the special agent in Boucher or the telephone conversation in Fricosu, the 
record in Doe IV failed to support the conclusion that the government “knew to any 
degree of particularity what, if anything, was hidden behind the encrypted wall.”178 
                                                          
170 Id. at 1237. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1349. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 1346–47. 
176 Id. at 1346. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 1349. 
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Thus, because the government did not know what was on the drive or whether he 
was capable of accessing it, the foregone conclusion doctrine did not apply.179 
Therefore, even though compulsion to reveal a password is protected because 
it reveals the contents of one’s mind,180 cases that involve passwords almost always 
relate to physical evidence such as computers and/or hard drives. The government 
cannot compel a defendant to disclose a password to decrypt the physical device. 
However, if the government can prove that it either has reason to know what is on 
the device, like in Boucher, or that the defendant is the only person capable of 
decrypting it, like in Fricosu, then the foregone conclusion doctrine will apply. In 
those cases, even though the government is not accessing one’s mind, they are 
forcing the person to provide a decrypted device. Therefore the distinction between 
the two is a distinction without a difference. If a defendant will not produce the 
decrypted device, the court is well within its rights to hold the defendant in 
contempt.181 Thus, the foregone conclusion doctrine is a limited solution for the 
government regarding compulsion of encrypted devices because it will only apply 
if the aforementioned conditions are met. 
III. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO DEAL WITH PROTECTED PASSWORDS 
As noted above, in situations where the government has a reason to know 
what the contents of a decrypted device contain or it can prove that a particular 
defendant is the only person that can decrypt the device, then the defendant will not 
be able to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
The government will simply bypass the password request and use the foregone 
conclusion doctrine to enforce production of a decrypted version of the password 
protected drive. As a result, when analyzing different alternatives that deal with the 
protected password dilemma, this Note generally assumes that the government is 
not able to use the foregone conclusion doctrine as an exception to the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
The following section analyzes different solutions to the password problem, 
including: (A) how allowing production immunity may be a viable solution in 
certain situations; (B) how issuing a contempt order on a defendant for life until 
they reveal their password is an impractical and unrealistic solution; (C) creating a 
                                                          
179 Id. 
180 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 31 (2000). 
181 See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) (“A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine 
or imprisonment, or both at its discretion, such as contempt of its authority, and none other, as—. . . (3) 
Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or commend.”). 
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backdoor access point for encryption technologies would prove fruitless; and (D) a 
legislative solution could prove to be the only viable non-judicial solution. 
A. Act-of-Production Immunity: Limited Applicability 
Under 18 U.S.C § 6002 Congress provided the government a way to compel 
the disclosure of evidence from a witness that would otherwise be protected from 
compelled disclosure under the Fifth Amendment.182 If a prosecutor grants a 
defendant production immunity under § 6002 in exchange for the defendant’s 
computer password, will the subsequent evidence uncovered after the decryption of 
the computer be covered within the “derivative” scope of the immunity granted the 
defendant? 
In Kastigar v. United States the Supreme Court dealt with the scope of the 
production immunity clause.183 Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, 
stating, “[i]n a subsequent prosecution, the prosecution has the burden of proving 
affirmatively that evidence proposed to be used is derived from a legitimate source 
wholly independent of the compelled testimony.”184 Justice Powell reinforced the 
position that the immunity clause is “consonant with Fifth Amendment standards” 
and that any information “directly or indirectly derived from such testimony” under 
such a “grant of immunity must be afforded protection commensurate with that 
afforded by the privilege, [and] need not be broader.”185 The Court was clear that a 
prosecutor could not give production immunity to a defendant and subsequently 
claim that the “derivative” information stemming from the information produced in 
exchange for immunity was not covered.186 Additionally, it was the prosecution’s 
burden to prove that the evidence proposed to be used against a defendant did not 
derive from evidence initially covered by the act-of-production immunity clause.187 
                                                          
182 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2012) (“Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against 
self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding . . . no testimony or other 
information compelled under the order may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a 
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.”). 
183 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
184 Id. at 441. 
185 Id. at 453. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 441. 
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A crafty prosecutor in Doe IV tested the application and scope of the term 
“derivative” evidence.188 The prosecutor tried to avoid the potential Fifth 
Amendment issues that would arise if the state compelled the defendant to provide 
his password to his computer drive by offering the defendant limited production 
immunity in exchange for his password.189 Doe refused to provide his password 
because he was afraid that the evidence uncovered by the state after using his 
password to decrypt his drive would fall outside of the “derivative” scope of the 
immunity granted.190 His concern was valid. The prosecution argued that the Doe 
should have accepted the immunity since it protected him from the use of the 
password and the decryption; however, Doe feared that it would not extend to the 
contents underneath the encryption, a distinction the prosecutor was trying to make 
regarding the scope of “immunity” which he was granting to Doe.191 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the prosecutor was wrong in assuming 
that the act-of-production label only extended to the password and the 
decryption.192 In analyzing whether evidence should be within the scope of the 
immunity, the court should ask “what conduct was actually immunized and what 
use would the Government make of the evidence derived from such a conduct in a 
future prosecution?”193 In referencing Kastigar, the court further reasoned that the 
government “cannot obtain immunity only for the act of production and then seek 
to introduce contents of the production, regardless of whether those contents are 
characterized as nontestimonial evidence, because doing so would allow the use of 
evidence derived from an original testimonial statement.”194 Consequently, the 
prosecutor could not compel Doe to disclose his password because the limited act-
of-production immunity did not offer Doe proper immunity to justify relinquishing 
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.195 
Therefore, assuming that the foregone conclusion doctrine does not apply, a 
prosecutor could get around Fifth Amendment privilege issues and compel a 
                                                          
188 See Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1338 (stating the U.S. attorney wanted to grant Doe immunity for his 
password but wanted to limit its use to the password and the decryption, not the contents that were later 
discovered). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 1350. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. 
194 See id. at 1351. 
195 Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1352. 
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defendant to reveal his or her password to an encrypted drive by offering the 
defendant full act-of-production immunity. One might ask why the prosecutor 
would do this? Furthermore, why would the prosecutor give the defendant a get out 
of jail free card, assuming the evidence uncovered from the decrypted drive 
contains incriminating evidence? The answer is found in the old idiom, “a bird in 
the hand is worth two in the bush.”196 If the defendant is a small player in a larger 
criminal conspiracy, and the evidence uncovered by granting password immunity 
to the defendant is worthwhile, then there may be reason to grant production 
immunity to the defendant. The alternative could result in losing both the greater 
criminal enterprise and the defendant, which without the decrypted drives would 
lead to a dropped case due to lack of evidence. A prosecutor might rather get the 
bigger player based on the decrypted evidence uncovered, instead of losing both 
birds in the bush. Therefore, in instances where the state is trying to build a greater 
case than the case brought against the defendant with the encrypted evidence, the 
act-of-production immunity available under § 6002 could be a useful prosecutorial 
tool. 
B. Contempt Until You Comply: A Controversial Solution 
The authority that a judge has to hold a defendant in contempt of court for 
failing to follow a decree or command is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 401.197 This 
authority includes the power to imprison a defendant for any misbehavior that may 
“obstruct the administration of justice.”198 In Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range 
Co., Justice Lamar for the Supreme Court stated that “the power of the courts to 
punish for contempt as is necessary and [an] integral part of the independence of 
the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed 
by law.”199 When a defendant violates a court order there are two separate wrongs 
that he or she is perpetrating.200 The first violation is the thwarting of the lawful 
processes of the court, and is addressed punitively under the notion of criminal 
                                                          
196 This idiom originated from ancient sage Ahikar and was articulated in his proverbs 49; see 
Sebastian Brock, The Proverbs of the Aramean Ahikar (700 B.C.), THE ARAMEAN DEMOCRATIC 
ORGANIZATION (Mar. 10, 2013, 9:20 AM), http://www.aramaic-dem.org/English/History/The%20 
proverbs%20of%20the%20Aramean%20Ahikar.pdf (“a sparrow in thy hand is better than a thousand 
sparrows flying . . . and a living fox is better than a dead lion”). 
197 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012). 
198 Id. 
199 Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). See also Mitchell J. Frank, 
Modern Odysseus Or Classic Fraud—Fourteen Years In Prison For Civil Contempt Without A Jury 
Trial, Judicial Power Without Limitation, And An Examination Of The Failure Of Due Process, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 599, 600 (2012). 
200 Robert H. Whorf, The Boundaries of Contempt: Must the Courts Power Yield to Due 
Process?, 46 MAY R.I. B.J. 9, 11 (1998). 
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contempt.201 The second wrong is that the defendant’s conduct damages the “party 
for whose benefit the court order exists.”202 This wrong is referred to as a civil 
contempt sanction, and it is “intended to provide a remedy for the party whose 
interests are impaired by the non-compliance.”203 
The main hallmark of civil coercive contempt is that it is designed to force “a 
reluctant defendant to comply with a court order.”204 The defendant can cure the 
contempt order by having the ability to “purge” the order, which simply means to 
do what the judge is asking them to do.205 However, because the purpose is to assist 
the plaintiff in obtaining enforcement of a court order, it is considered civil in 
nature rather than criminal.206 Since coercive contempt is “imposed as an adjunct to 
an action in equity” and equitable procedures are followed, no jury trial is available 
to the defendant.207 Thus, because the contemnor has the ability to purge the order 
at any time, a contemnor “facing civil sanction is entitled to far less due process 
than one facing an ordinary criminal contempt sentence.”208 After all, the defendant 
is said to have the “keys to their prison in their own pockets.”209 
This lower level of rights afforded to defendants who are thrown in jail for 
civil contempt, as opposed to criminal, contempt is very troubling. Justice 
Blackmun in United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell stated that, “[c]ivil 
contempt proceedings leave the offended judge solely responsible for identifying, 
prosecuting, adjudicating, and sanctioning the contumacious conduct.”210 And the 
“contempt power uniquely is ‘liable to abuse.’”211 Justice Blackmun’s concern is 
that defendants will not be afforded due process when they are held in civil 
contempt, and that only judges will be the sole arbiter of their rights instead of 
                                                          
201 Id. at 10. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 352 (2000). 
205 See Whorf, supra note 200, at 11. 
206 See Livingston, supra note 204, at 353. 
207 Id. 
208 See Whorf, supra note 200, at 11. 
209 In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). 
210 United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994). 
211 Id. (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968)). 
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juries.212 The Supreme Court has remained silent regarding how long a judge can 
keep a defendant in jail solely based on coercive contempt.213 
The Court has come up with two approaches regarding how long a defendant 
who is detained due to a civil contempt order may be incarcerated.214 The first 
approach was articulated by the Supreme Court in Maggio v. Zeitz.215 The Court 
articulated that a contemnor’s “denial of possession is given credit after 
demonstrat[ing] that a period in prison does not produce the goods.”216 This created 
a rationale, although not a rule articulated by the Court specifically, that a 
defendant should be held in contempt only if keeping him there would have a 
coercive effect.217 The second approach was formulated in Bagwell, and stated that 
unless a defendant complied with the civil contempt order he could face indefinite 
confinement without any jury trial.218 Furthermore, the burden of proof rested on 
the defendant to prove impossible compliance with the order.219 These two 
different standards have created very different results. When did the order lose its 
coercive effect, and therefore make the order feel more like a criminal contempt 
order where defendants are afforded their due process rights?220 Additionally, how 
can the defendant ever prove impossible compliance with an order, and thwart off 
indefinite confinement if their incarceration makes it impossible to prove an 
inability to comply? This is especially true if the civil contempt order is to reveal a 
password or produce a decrypted drive to the state, since the detainee might have 
been in prison for a long period of time and may have genuinely forgotten the 
password. This would make compliance impossible, and possibly under Bagwell 
lead to indefinite confinement without due process. 
                                                          
212 Id. 
213 Frank, supra note 199, at 634–35. 
214 See id. at 631 (comparing the two Supreme Court standards articulated regarding coercive civil 
contempt jail durations a defendant might be subject to). 
215 Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948). 
216 Id. at 76. 
217 See Marlene DiGiacomo, Judge Finally Sets Former Lawyer Free After 14 Years, DELAWARE 
COUNTY DAILY TIMES (July 11, 2009), http://www.delcotimes.com/articles/2009/07/11/news/ 
doc4a57fea1b39ed606977003.prt (the judge for the defendant’s final successful appeal after a fourteen 
yearlong jailing due to civil contempt, commented that in order to be lawful, the petitioner’s 
confinement for civil contempt of court must have a coercive effect). 
218 United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827 (1994). 
219 See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 757 (1983). 
220 See Whorf, supra note 200, at 10 (stating that since “criminal contempt is a crime in the 
ordinary sense . . . [t]herefore carries with it the full panoply of due process rights to which the 
criminally accused are normally entitled” (footnote omitted)). 
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On April 5, 1995, H. Beatty Chadwick was arrested for civil contempt in 
connection with his divorce proceedings.221 Fourteen years later, on July 10, 2009 
he was released from prison.222 He was suspected of embezzling $2.5 million in 
order to conceal the money from his ex-wife.223 However, Chadwick contended 
that the money went toward bad investments.224 He continued appealing the case, 
claiming that there should be limits of imprisonment for contempt.225 He urged the 
judges to acknowledge that the confinement lost its coercive effect, and therefore 
he should be released from prison.226 It ultimately took numerous appeals and 
fourteen years for his release to occur.227 
What is so troubling about the lack of due process afforded to “civil” 
contempt confinements is the comparison Professor Frank makes regarding how 
long Chadwick was imprisoned, compared to other types of criminal penalties 
given out for various criminal convictions.228 Murder in the third degree, is 
punishable by as little as six years in prison.229 A defendant convicted of robbery 
with a serious bodily injury is subject to a recommended sentence of a minimum of 
six years in prison.230 Had Chadwick simply stolen the money from 
Mrs. Chadwick, he would have been guilty of theft, which is punishable by up to 
seven years in prison.231 The conclusion is that the lack of due process in coercive 
contempt cases can subject a defendant to greater punitive harm than if the 
defendant would have pleaded guilty to the alleged embezzlement. 
In criminal cases where the state seeks to compel disclosure of the 
defendant’s computer password, and the foregone conclusion doctrine does not 
apply, the defendant will not have to worry about the court issuing an order to 
compel disclosure.232 As Doe IV illustrates, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Fifth 
                                                          
221 Frank, supra note 199, at 600. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 603. 
224 Id. at 605. 
225 Id. at 632. 
226 Id. at 630. 
227 DiGiacomo, supra note 217. 
228 See Frank, supra note 199, at 628. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 629. 
232 Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1353. 
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Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination protects defendants from 
revealing the contents of their minds.233 But what about situations where the judge 
could grant an order of civil contempt if the defendant does not produce the 
decrypted information that he or she is compelled to produce? This situation arises 
when the foregone conclusion doctrine forces the defendant, not to disclose a 
password, but to produce an already decrypted device. 
In Fricosu, the defendant received production immunity for her decrypted 
drive, and therefore provided it to the state.234 But what if she was not receiving 
immunity from the prosecutor for the unencrypted drive, and she refused to 
produce it after the court ordered her to? Would the court then keep her in prison 
until she complied? The court in every subsequent appeal by Fricosu would have to 
decide whether to apply the Bagwell (indefinite confinement) standard or the 
Maggio (confinement until no coercive effect exists) standard.235 In the Chadwick 
case, the court did not believe that he sincerely relinquished the money to pay a 
debt.236 The court undoubtedly reasoned that he knew where it was hidden. 
However, unlike Mr. Chadwick, Ms. Fricosu is asked to use a password that is 
stored in her mind to decrypt her hard drive. Ms. Fricosu could forget the 
password, as humans are often times forgetful; Mr. Chadwick, however, had assets 
that were liquidated, and hidden in a place that probably would not fade in 
Chadwick’s memory over time. The longer Ms. Fricosu is in prison under the 
Bagwell line of reasoning the greater the possibility that she will forget the 
password. Therefore, if she genuinely loses the ability to decrypt the hard drive, 
how can she still be punished for having to comply with a “civil order” that she will 
never be able to comply with? 
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Cantena v. Seidl, stated that it was 
abhorrent to [the court’s] concept of personal freedom 
that the process of civil contempt can be used to jail a 
person indefinitely, possibly for life, even though he or 
she refuses to comply with the court’s order . . . . The 
legal justification for commitment for civil contempt is 
to secure compliance. Once it appears that the 
commitment has lost its coercive power, the legal 
                                                          
233 Id. at 1346. 
234 Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. 
235 See Part III B supra discussing Bagwell and Maggio. 
236 Chadwick v. Janeka, 312 F.3d 597, 600 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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justification for it ends and further confinement cannot 
be tolerated.”237 
Thus, issuing coercive contempt orders for cases that involve encrypted 
evidence that falls under the ambit of the foregone conclusion doctrine is 
technically a feasible option. However, it is a very controversial practice because 
there is a possibility for judges to abuse their power like in Chadwick’s case. Under 
this practice, defendants could be imprisoned for an indefinite or excessive period 
of time without due process.238 Accordingly, coercive contempt is not the best 
solution in situations where the defendant fails to follow a judge’s directive to 
produce certain evidence. 
A legislative directive, as discussed in section D is a better approach. As 
Professor Frank articulated the point at issue: 
[W]hether Chadwick was a modern Odysseus of a 
classic fraud, the judicial system failed him. . . . The 
substantial likelihood that he was very far from blame-
less does not change the fact that he was entitled to the 
benefits of the due process clause. No legal authority 
need be cited for the proposition that even those who 
commit the most heinous crimes will be provided such 
protection.239 
C. Compelling “Backdoor” Access Would Prove Fruitless 
Picture the scenario where a defendant has numerous encrypted hard drives 
that the prosecutor needs to access in order to make her case. What if the 
prosecutor did not have to deal with the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to stay 
silent, or the burden of proving to a judge that the foregone conclusion doctrine 
would entitle her under a possible contempt order to a decrypted version of the hard 
drives? This would be ideal because the prosecutor could make her case in a more 
efficient and less cumbersome manner. Why not just have a “backdoor” entrance to 
the encryption programs currently used that would not require obtaining the 
password to the drives from the defendant? This would be ideal, however, there are 
                                                          
237 Cantena v. Seidl, 321 A.2d 225, 228 (N.J. 1974). 
238 See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (due process of law is afforded every individual under the 
following section of the Fourteenth Amendment; “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law”). 
239 Frank, supra note 199, at 646. 
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serious problems that arise with this type of conduct. They include incorporating 
backdoor entrances while obtaining encryption provider consent, possible Fourth 
Amendment constitutional violations, and alternative encryption technologies that 
could operate outside the U.S. and contain “unbackdoorable” code. 
Microsoft has stated publicly that it does not plan to include any backdoors 
for BitLocker.240 TrueCrypt, the encryption software used by the defendant in Doe 
IV, has similarly denied the existence of a “backdoor” to its multi-platform 
encryption utility.241 This reluctance by mainstream encryption providers suggests 
that they will not incorporate “backdoors” into their software without legislative 
directive. 
The next concern with using “backdoors” to avoid the problem raised by the 
compelled disclosure of a computer password involves privacy concerns. These 
concerns are likely based on the assumption that the FBI or the National Security 
Agency (N.S.A.) could create “backdoors” even without the permission or help of 
current encryption technologies. Thus, the issue becomes whether an encryption 
user expects their privacy interests to be protected from unreasonable search and 
seizures that an unauthorized “backdoor” might cause. 
In Katz v. United States, Justice Stewart, writing for the Supreme Court, 
inferred that the Fourth Amendment protects people using public mediums in a 
private manner.242 By this he meant that the Constitution protects places where 
society would expect a person’s privacy to be protected.243 The defendant in Katz 
made a phone call from a phone booth, which the Court deemed to be an area 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, because although it was a public space, Katz 
was using the booth in a private manner.244 Despite this ruling, the test that the 
Supreme Court has applied since Katz to decide Fourth Amendment privacy issues 
comes from Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz.245 Justice Harlan declared that an 
                                                          
240 See Part III B supra discussing encryption software. See also Evers, supra note 54 (stating that 
Niels Fergusson, a developer and cryptographer at Microsoft, indicated that the suggestion that 
Microsoft is working with governments to create a “backdoor” so that they can always access BitLocker 
encrypted data is simply not true, and would happen “over his dead body”). 
241 See Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1340; see also Frequently Asked Questions, TRUECRYPT.ORG, 
http://www.truecrypt.org/faq (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). 
242 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
243 See id. at 352 (explaining that when a medium like a public telephone has become adopted by 
society for private communication, then the public telephone would become a type of medium that is 
protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
244 See id. at 351. 
245 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (stating that “[c]onsistently with Katz, 
this Court uniformly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the 
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individual’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy is based on a twofold 
requirement.246 First, the person must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy and, second[,] the expectation [must] be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”247 
We do not know if accessing data that is purposely encrypted by its users is a 
place that the Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful searches and seizures, 
because the Supreme Court has not directly decided that issue. However, is 
encryption technology that is meant to keep files and data protected an area where a 
user would have a reasonable expectation of privacy? I would argue that it is 
considered an area where people expect privacy. The Court in Katz, was willing to 
let a place which is normally a public area with no expectation of privacy fall 
within the ambit of Fourth Amendment protection solely because it was used by a 
person in a private manner.248 Thus, wouldn’t a person’s use of technology that is 
meant to protect and keep data private not obviously fall under the Katz line of 
thinking? It is clear that many computer users that use privately-owned computers 
only purchase and use encryption software to ensure their data remains private. If 
any place would fall under an area protected from government intrusion, it would 
be a user’s encrypted data. The “backdoor” employed by the FBI or NSA would be 
analogous to the wiretap left in the phone booth in Katz, and therefore should be 
protected under Katz. 
In order for the government to challenge Katz as being dispositive, it would 
probably contend that a “backdoor” is not an intrusive invasion of a defendant’s 
privacy. This argument would be based on Schmerber v. California, which held 
that physical intrusions such as blood testing involved minimal intrusions that are 
widely accepted by society as procedures that do not unreasonably infringe on 
personal privacy.249 This argument is not persuasive since society has not accepted 
computer “backdoors” as a minimally accepted physical intrusion of privacy. 
Additionally, the blood test as used by police would reveal very limited 
information as opposed to a “backdoor” entrance of an encrypted computer, which 
could reveal a tremendous amount of information that the user expects to be 
private. Thus, the two intrusions are not analogous, and the government would 
probably lose the society based minimally intrusive argument. 
                                                                                                                                      
person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of 
privacy’ that has been invaded by government action”). 
246 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
247 Id. 
248 See id. at 351. 
249 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 757 (1966). 
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However, assuming arguendo, it was legal for the government to create their 
own “backdoors” in encryption software, and computer users did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when using those programs, the question 
remains: would these government created “backdoors” be effective in collecting 
incriminating evidence? The answer to that question lies in the fact that in today’s 
globalized world, software and encryption technologies spread quickly across the 
world via the Internet at an alarming speed.250 
In 2000, then President Bill Clinton, mainly drawing from a legislative 
proposal called the Security Freedom Through Encryption Act (SAFE), inter alia 
lifted bans that had precluded American companies from competing in the 
international market for strong encryption products.251 The move allowed virtually 
any data encryption program sold in the U.S. market to be sold overseas, pending a 
one-time review by the U.S. Department of Commerce.252 More importantly the 
government would allow, without a license, the encryption programs’ source code 
to be exported.253 The technology overwhelmed the government’s ability to control 
a majority of these products, including some that could be downloaded for free off 
the Internet.254 
Therein lay the answer to the question of whether “backdoors” created by the 
government would be an effective tool to get encrypted data from uncooperative 
defendants. They would not be effective in the long run because encryption 
technologies are massively shared, openly sold throughout the world, and as soon 
as it is known that the government had a “backdoor” on an encryption technology, 
a new encryption technology that was “unbackdoorable” would be created by the 
encryption software company. And, because U.S. companies have been sharing 
current and new encryption technologies freely since 2000, the government would 
not be able to compel a U.S. company to stop creating programs that would not 
allow for “backdoors.” The company could simply say that it did not create the 
program, and some competing internationally based encryption developer would 
advertise “unbackdoorable” software products. The “aphorism that national borders 
                                                          
250 Adam C. Bonin, Comment, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amendment Challenges to 
Cryptography Regulation, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 502 (1996). 
251 Teddy Kang, Cryptography, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOCIETY AT HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY (last visited Mar. 13, 2013), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/privacy/Encryption%20 
Description.html. 
252 David E. Sanger & Jeri Clausing, U.S. Removes More Limits on Encryption, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 13, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/13/business/us-removes-more-limits-on-encryption 
.html. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
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have been speed bumps on the information superhighway seems true; once in 
cyberspace, encryption technology spreads uncontrollably.”255 Therefore, even if 
the hypothetical where the government created its own “backdoors” were true, due 
to commercial competition and an inability to control companies producing 
technologies via the Internet, “backdoors” would be an ineffective way for 
prosecutors to get encrypted data from savvy defendants. 
D. Legislative Directive from Congress, a Viable Solution 
The final alternative that this Note analyzes is legislative action by Congress. 
Can Congress enact a law that violates an individual’s Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination? The analysis hinges on the type of right potentially 
being violated (fundamental or not), and if the Supreme Court agrees with the 
government’s reason for doing so.256 
1. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Is a Fundamental Right 
By the end of the 17th century, the privilege against self-incrimination was 
firmly established in the American colonies.257 Throughout the colonies, the 
general principle that individuals should not be compelled to produce evidence 
against themselves emerged as a fundamental right.258 After the Revolutionary 
War, colonial leaders drafted constitutions to ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights, many of which included the privilege against self-incrimination.259 Later, 
when the Bill of Rights became necessary to allay the concerns that the new federal 
government would be too powerful, the colonial leaders said that without a 
privilege against self-incrimination they could not ensure the protection of 
individuals from the “evils that lurked in the shadows of a new and untried 
sovereignty.”260 The privilege against self-incrimination was subsequently adopted 
in the Bill of Rights within the text of the Fifth Amendment.261 The Supreme Court 
has recognized the importance of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
                                                          
255 Bonin, supra note 250, at 503. 
256 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 814–17 
(4th ed. 2011). 
257 See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 97 (1968). 
258 Id. at 332–404. 
259 O. JOHN ROGGE, THE FIRST & THE FIFTH 184–85 (1960) (stating Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire included self-incrimination 
clauses in their state constitutions or bill of rights). 
260 R. Carter Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935). 
261 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against 
himself . . .”). 
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incrimination. In 1973, the Court in Roe v. Wade found that the rights explicitly 
found in the Bill of Rights were fundamental constitutional rights.262 The Court 
again in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez held the right against self-
incrimination to be fundamental.263 
2. Fundamental Rights Are Afforded Strict-Scrutiny 
When Congress creates a law that is challenged as infringing upon a 
fundamental right, the standard that the judiciary reviews that law under is 
classified as strict-scrutiny.264 The notion of different levels of judicial review 
depending on the rights the Court was analyzing came from a now famous footnote 
found in United States v. Carolene Products Co.265 The strict scrutiny standard 
affords the least deference to lawmakers and is the most intensive form of 
review.266 Under strict scrutiny, a law will be upheld if it meets the following three 
conditions: (1) the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose, 
and it is necessary as a means to accomplishing an end; (2) it is the least restrictive 
or least discriminatory alternative; and (3) the law must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve that goal or interest.267 
3. National Security/Global War on Terror and Child Protection are 
Compelling Government Interests 
Under strict scrutiny analysis, the government has the burden to show that the 
law is necessary to accomplish a compelling governmental purpose.268 Although 
the Supreme Court never articulated explicit criteria for determining whether a 
claimed purpose is compelling, the government must persuade the Court that a 
                                                          
262 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
263 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990). 
264 See CHEMERINSKY ET AL., supra note 256, at 812. 
265 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); see CHEMERINKSY ET AL., supra 
note 256, at 640 (“In a famous footnote, the Court would defer to the government and uphold laws so 
long as they were reasonable. . . . In other words, courts generally would presume that laws are 
constitutional. However, this deference would be replaced by a ‘more searching judicial inquiry’ when it 
is a law that interferes with individual rights, or a law that restricts the ability of the political process to 
repeal undesirable legislation, or a law that discriminates against a ‘discrete and insular’ minority”). 
266 See CHEMERINSKY ET AL., supra note 256, at 554. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. 
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truly vital interest is served by the law in question.269 The Court has recognized 
compelling interests in situations involving war-related efforts and child welfare.270 
Therefore, the first compelling interest for violating an individual’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in situations involving the 
compelled disclosure of a password would likely be a national security interest to 
combat the “Global War Against Terror.”271 However, can this interest really be 
considered vital enough that the Supreme Court would allow the violation of a 
fundamental right? 
In 1944, the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, a decision that has 
never been overturned, held constitutional an order by the government to intern all 
Japanese Americans on the West Coast during World War II because the United 
States was at war with Japan.272 Justice Black, writing for the majority, explained 
that to “cast [Korematsu’s] case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference 
to the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue. . . . 
Congress, reposing its confidences in this time of war in our military leaders—as 
inevitably it must [be]—determined that they should have the power to do just 
this.”273 The Court in a six to three decision determined that the possibility of 
espionage or disloyalty by some combined with the urgency of war created a 
compelling enough interest to sequester Japanese Americans.274 As a result, the law 
passed the strict scrutiny test.275 
The law and governmental interests at issue in Korematsu seem analogous to 
a law that, in the interest of the “global war against terrorism,” seeks to compel a 
defendant’s disclosure of a computer password to retrieve encrypted data. In fact, 
                                                          
269 Id. at 817. 
270 See id. 
271 See Ari Shapiro, Obama Team Stops Saying “Global War on Terror” But Doesn’t Stop 
Waging It, NPR (Mar. 11, 2013, 4:38 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2013/03/11/ 
174034634/obama-team-stops-saying-global-war-on-terror-but-doesnt-stop-waging-it (stating that 
George W. Bush after Sept. 11, 2001 argued that the U.S. was fighting a war without a typical 
battlefield, and that even though President Obama vowed to change the rhetoric that Bush coined the 
“Global war on terror,” Obama is continuing the same type of actions under justified circumstances 
rhetoric). 
272 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). 
273 Id. 
274 See id. 
275 Id. at 216 (The court found the test to be applied in the Korematsu case was a strict scrutiny 
standard by declaring “[t]his is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that 
courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the 
existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”). 
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the internment of all Japanese Americans is a far more intrusive, and racist, 
interest. In the law proposed by this Note, a defendant would not be compelled to 
disclose her password unless there was probable cause that the defendant was 
acting in a manner that was against the interests of national security. There would 
be no interning of a group of people, instead just a way to compel a defendant, who 
the government has reason to believe might be a terrorist or is aiding a terrorist, to 
give up valuable national security related information. Otherwise, if the defendant 
does not cooperate with the government he could face a jury instruction that raises 
the inference of guilt at trial.276 
Unlike World War II, the “War on Terror” is a significant daily threat. The 
world is different that it was in 1944; countries and economies are intertwined in 
what is known as the “global borderless world.”277 As Dr. John Psarouthakis of the 
Nyenrode Business University states, “[c]ommunication and information 
technology do not have nationalities anymore. They flow essentially freely in and 
out through national borders.”278 Terrorists looking to hurt the United States can 
easily communicate with other terrorists, through encrypted data technologies that 
operate globally. Because “backdoor” access to a potential terrorist’s encrypted 
drives is not a realistic option279 and holding a defendant in contempt for an 
indefinite duration is against due process rights,280 how else might the government 
be able to get encrypted data that might disrupt a terrorist plot? 
For example, in August 2004, the British authorities charged eight terrorist 
operatives with conspiracy to commit murder, and worldwide bombings.281 This 
was a global terrorist operation. The United Kingdom plots targeted mass transit 
                                                          
276 See John E.D. Larkin, Compelled Production of Encrypted Data, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 
253, 276–77 (2012) (Larkin explains how the missing witness instruction is not such a new concept. 
Today, when evidence or a potential witness is missing due to one parties bad faith, the court may 
instruct the “jury to draw an inference that the missing evidence or testimony would have been 
unfavorable.”); see also Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The 
prevailing rule is that bad faith destruction of a document relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise 
to a strong inference that production of the document would have been unfavorable to the party 
responsible for its destruction.”). 
277 John Psarouthakis, The Challenge of Rapid Change in a Borderless World, THE BUSINESS 
THINKER (June 9, 2010), http://businessthinker.com/the-challenge-of-rapid-change-in-a-borderless-
world/. 
278 Id. 
279 See Part III C supra discussing why this is not a realistic option. 
280 See Part III B supra discussing why this violates due process rights. 
281 See Prosecution case against al-Qaeda Briton, BBC NEWS (June 11, 2006, 2:35 PM), 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6122270.stm 
[hereinafter al-Qaeda Briton]. 
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operations, including Heathrow airport, and the underground rail system.282 
Amongst the eight members indicted, Dhiren Barot, a British citizen of the Muslim 
faith, was suspected of conducting U.S. based surveillance of potential economic 
targets for possible attacks.283 These locations included the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank buildings in Washington D.C., the New York Stock 
Exchange and Citigroup buildings in New York City, and the Prudential building in 
Newark, New Jersey.284 
Although Barot was arrested in Britain in August, 2004, the discovery of 
computer documents in Pakistan led the U.S. to raise the terrorism alert to ‘high 
risk,’ for the financial sectors in Washington, New York, and Newark.285 This 
foiled plot was truly a global operation with data capture and information exchange 
having occurred in the United States, Pakistan, and England.286 
In England, where the eight suspects were tried and convicted, the 
government employs an “inference of guilt” rule when a defendant refuses to 
answer a magistrate’s inquiries regarding informational requests.287 Therefore, the 
suspects’ refusal to comply with the order to produce a password for any encrypted 
data would result in an inference of guilt due to the suspects’ failure to comply. 
Had Barot been arrested in the United States, he could have asserted his right 
against self-incrimination not to reveal his password. Assuming that the foregone 
conclusion doctrine did not apply, the courts would be obligated to follow 
Hubbell’s premise that the contents of one’s mind is protected from compelled 
disclosure by the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination.288 The 
Barot example illustrates how having an inference of guilt if a defendant fails to 
follow the informational requests by a judge may help serve a very vital interest—
the assistance in capturing technologically savvy terrorists. The capturing of 
technologically savvy criminals that use global means and methods to wreak havoc 
                                                          
282 Id. 
283 John Mintz & Kamran Khan, Britain Charges 8 in Alleged Terror Plot, THE WASHINGTON 
POST (Aug. 18, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7913-2004Aug17.html. 
284 al-Qaeda Briton, supra note 281. 
285 Mintz & Khan, supra note 283. 
286 See id. 
287 See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, LEGISLATION.GOV.UK, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/33/part/III/crossheading/inferences-from-accuseds-silence 
(last visited Mar. 14, 2013) (under section 36 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act a magistrate 
is able to relate an inference of guilt to the jury if the defendant fails to give evidence at trial or answer 
any questions relating to the production of the evidence requested). 
288 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 43 (2000). 
  
 
 
G I V E  M E  Y O U R  P A S S W O R D  
Volume XIV – Fall 2013 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 
DOI 10.5195/tlp.2013.132 ● http://tlp.law.pitt.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
on the U.S. as well as worldwide citizens should not be able to hide behind the 
United States’ constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. 
The second compelling state interest that the U.S. Attorney General would 
raise in response to a constitutional challenge against a law that creates an 
inference of guilt when a defendant refuses to follow a court order that compels 
disclosure of a password to a legally seized computer, is child welfare. Government 
research has estimated that approximately 300,000 children are abused every year 
in the United States.289 One serious form of child abuse is child pornography. 
Attorney General Eric Holder Jr. has recognized how serious a problem child 
pornography has become, and stated the following in a recent conference: 
“Unfortunately, we’ve also seen a historic rise in the distribution of child 
pornography, in the number of images being shared online, and in the level of 
violence associated with child exploitation and sexual abuse crimes.”290 
The Supreme Court has found that child welfare is a valid compelling state 
interest even if it might restrict a defendant’s fundamental right.291 In Zablocki v. 
Redhail, the Court allowed Wisconsin to interfere with a defendant’s ability to 
marry unless the defendant paid child support obligations.292 Wisconsin’s 
compelling state interest was to reduce the number of children that were not 
provided for by their biological parents and, consequently, the number of children 
requiring state support. The state’s interest in trying to ensure that children are not 
being financially neglected pales in comparison to the government’s interest in 
protecting children from being victims of child pornography. If the Supreme Court 
in Zablocki found a compelling state interest to protect children from the results of 
financial neglect, the Court by the same logic should find that a child’s protection 
from sexual abuse and exploitation would be an equally vital interest. In both Doe 
IV and Kirschner, the defendants were accused of having child pornography in 
their encrypted drives, but the prosecution could not make its case due to the 
defendants’ Fifth Amendment protection.293 However, if a federal law had been in 
place allowing the fact-finders to infer guilt based on a missing evidence 
instruction, maybe the defendants would have been convicted. 
                                                          
289 Child sexual abuse: What parents should know, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/child-sexual-abuse.aspx (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
290 Child Exploitation & Obscenity Section, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/subjectareas/childporn.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
291 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 378 (1978). 
292 CHEMERINSKY ET AL., supra note 256, at 820. 
293 Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 669; Doe IV, 670 F.3d at 1346. See Part II B supra discussing 
Doe IV and Kirschner. 
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4. The Directive Could Pass the Narrowly Tailored Requirement 
Under the strict scrutiny level of review it is not enough that the government 
is able to show that there is a compelling interest behind the law.294 When there is 
an infringement of a fundamental right it is the government’s burden to prove that 
there are no other less restrictive measures than the one that Congress fashioned.295 
This is the second prong of the strict scrutiny form of judicial review. The law 
proposed by this Note could be designed in a way that makes it the least restrictive 
way for a prosecutor to get a password to encrypted evidence from a non-
cooperating defendant. The least restrictive way in which the state does not have to 
sacrifice its case against the defendant in order to gain access to the data is to 
simply allow the judge to give the jury a missing evidence instruction that 
presumes the data to be incriminating. This way the defendant is still afforded due 
process and the right to a trial by jury, unlike indefinite civil contempt. It is the 
least restrictive alternative because it is only an instruction, and provides for a 
rebuttable presumption that may be overcome by the defendant at trial. 
The final prong that the government needs to prove in order for a 
constitutionally challenged law to pass strict scrutiny is that the law is “narrowly 
tailored” to further the government’s compelling interests.296 In order for a law to 
be narrowly tailored and therefore a justifiable means to an end, the law cannot be 
over or under inclusive.297 A law is underinclusive “if it does not apply to 
individuals who are similar to those to whom the law applies.”298 For example, a 
driving law that excludes those under the age of sixteen from having a drivers’ 
license is somewhat underinclusive because there are younger drivers that have the 
physical ability and the maturity to be acceptable drivers.299 A law is overinclusive 
if it applies to those that the government does not need to include in order to 
achieve its purpose.300 
In Korematsu, although the majority did not apply inclusivity in order to 
determine whether the law was narrowly tailored, the law was clearly both under 
                                                          
294 CHEMERINSKY ET AL., supra note 256, at 816. 
295 Id. 
296 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 509 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
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and over inclusive.301 The decision to evacuate Japanese Americans during World 
War II was overinclusive because most of the Japanese Americans were not spies 
for the Japanese, and forcing all Japanese to evacuate to the West Coast included 
innocent Americans.302 The law was underinclusive if the goal was to isolate those 
who were a threat to security, since other nationalities who might have posed a 
danger like German Americans were not evacuated.303 
Comparing the law in Korematsu to a law, which creates a legal mechanism 
that allows a fact-finder to receive a missing evidence instruction, the latter would 
not be over-inclusive. Instead of signaling out a group of defendants the law is 
targeting, the law would apply only to those defendants in which the law has good 
reason to infer guilt. The law would allow for a judge to issue a missing evidence 
instruction that would infer the missing data to be incriminating only after the state 
was able to secure a warrant, subpoena, and the defendant was not willing to 
comply with the decryption order. Thus, the law will apply equally to all criminal 
defendants that the state would like to prosecute irrespective of the underlying 
crime. However, since the missing data instruction will be given only if the state 
has probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the underlying 
crime, the jury instruction would not include defendants who did not do anything 
wrong. As the warrant requirement to get this instruction must be reviewed by a 
neutral magistrate, the limiting instruction law would not be over-inclusive. 
Critics of a “negative inference” solution to the password compulsion 
quandary might argue that even if the law would not be over-inclusive as proposed, 
it is under-inclusive. The crux of this argument lies in the fact that Congress’ 
reason for having this inference, mainly to protect children and national security 
interests, does not included other potential interests. Computer fraud, wire fraud, 
and other white collar crimes to name a few, could easily be the underlying 
criminal activity in a state’s case that requires the government to get a defendant’s 
computer password. 
However, even if a proposed law is under-inclusive that does not mean it is 
sure to be invalidated.304 The question that was answered in Korematsu relates to 
whether the solution is the best fit between the “government’s means and its ends” 
even if the law is over or under inclusive.305 As previously examined, many of the 
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other possibilities could not accomplish a way around the password problem in a 
less restrictive fashion. Having a negative inference of guilt would still afford the 
defendant the ability to rebut the presumption. Also, the negative inference would 
not be allowed by a judge unless there was probable cause of the crime, and a 
significant connection established between the defendant and the computer 
password in question. 
Therefore, because this law would be the least restrictive way to enforce the 
state’s compelling interests, and the law could be drafted in a way that is not over-
inclusive, the law would pass the narrowly tailored strict-scrutiny prong. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Data encryption technologies currently offer cyber thieves, terrorists, and 
child predators a safe haven for their illegal activities. Currently, a criminal can 
commit an illegal act and store it on a personal computer using an encryption 
technology, like TrueCrypt, making the data inaccessible without the criminal’s 
password. The criminal is therefore free to continue with his or her illegal activities 
because a prosecutor will not be able to charge the criminal without the evidence. 
Unless the prosecutor is able to use the foregone conclusion doctrine by 
proving to the judge that the government has reason to know what is on the 
encrypted device, the prosecutor is basically out of luck. Compulsion of a computer 
password is covered by a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. 
However, there are some strategies that have been employed or suggested in 
order to solve the password compulsion problem. Prosecutors may grant a 
defendant production immunity in order to get the defendant’s password, but that 
strategy would make the evidence uncovered after the password is obtained 
inadmissible against the defendant. This strategy might be good for a prosecutor 
who is trying to compel a password from a small fish in a large criminal pond, but 
barring that scenario, the immunity would be pointless.306 Another solution to the 
password problem entails keeping the defendant in coercive civil contempt if the 
defendant does not provide the password under court order. This solution can lead 
to long periods of incarceration, infringing on a defendant’s due process rights.307 
At first glance, law enforcement’s use of “backdoors” to access the 
defendant’s encrypted data looks like an efficient theoretical solution. However, 
                                                          
306 See Part III A supra discussing this solution. 
307 See Part III B supra discussing this solution. 
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“backdoors” raise Fourth Amendment privacy concerns, and are unrealistic because 
the major encryption software providers have all refused to entertain such a notion. 
Because the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to hear the question of 
whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination extends to 
defendant computer passwords, a legislative option might be the only viable 
solution. A federal law that permits a judge to give a missing evidence instruction 
after a combination of a warrant and subpoena could not induce a defendant to 
decrypt his data is a viable solution. Because the law would infringes upon a 
fundamental right—the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination—the 
law would have to survive the strict scrutiny test to be constitutional. The 
government can prove that the law serves a compelling interest because the 
encrypted data could involve child pornography and terrorist activities, both 
criminal activities that the state has a vital interest to stop. Such a law would not 
open a defendant’s computer or electronic device, and does not compel the 
disclosure of incriminating testimony, and therefore would be the least restrictive 
way to solve the password disclosure problem. Finally, because the inference 
would be given only after a warrant and probable cause were present, the law is not 
over-inclusive. It only applies to defendants for which probable cause exists to 
search their encrypted device in the first place. Accordingly, the law should pass a 
strict scrutiny level of judicial review. 
A law that does not compel a defendant to provide a password, but holds the 
defendant accountable for criminal activities, will afford justice for the victims, 
instead of a technological get out of jail free card. 
